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ABSTRACT 
At the beginning of his famous paper “Moral Luck,” Thomas Nagel notes that it is 
intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for what is beyond their 
control.  He then argues that most, if not all, of what people do is beyond their control.  
Thus, Nagel concludes that individuals must deny that people cannot be morally assessed 
for what is beyond their control, alter the way they think about morality, or abandon the 
belief that moral assessment is possible.  I contend that one’s best option is to alter the 
way one thinks about morality and therefore draw from the work of Michael J. 
Zimmerman to construct and defend a counterfactual theory of moral assessment which 
looks not only at the kind of person one is and the kinds of actions one performs but also 
at the kind of person one would be and the kinds of actions one would perform in certain 
counterfactual circumstances.  In closing, I explain why one who accepts my 
counterfactual theory of moral assessment has reason to prefer virtue ethical theories of 
morality to their consequentialist and deontological counterparts.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the television series Criminal Minds, members of the Behavioral Analysis Unit 
(BAU) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) attempt to find and apprehend serial 
killers by psychologically profiling the suspects.  In one particular episode, the serial 
killer turns out to be comic book artist Jonny McHale, who turns violent only after 
witnessing the brutal murder of his fiancé and suffering a psychotic break.  In the 
episode’s closing scene, two members of the BAU, Emily Prentiss and David Rossi, have 
the following conversation: 
 
Rossi: Something wrong? 
Prentiss: He’s the first unsub [unknown subject] I’ve worked that 
wasn’t a bad guy, you know?  Six months ago Jonny 
McHale was just a regular person. 
Rossi: Every unsub is ill on some level.  Most can’t help what 
they do any more than Jonny could. 
Prentiss: But he went from successful writer and artist to brutal killer 
in six months. 
Rossi: He suffered an unbelievable tragedy. 
Prentiss: I know; I get it. 
Rossi: So what’s bugging you? 
Prentiss: It just makes me wonder, aren’t we all capable of becoming 
something like that? 
 
As her statement indicates, Prentiss recognizes that were she to undergo the same 
experiences as McHale, she too might turn violent.  Now, this fact might be less 
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disturbing to Prentiss had McHale done something to put himself at risk of undergoing 
such experiences,
1
 but he did not.  McHale was simply unlucky.   
 Given that McHale was unlucky to undergo the experiences he did and that 
undergoing those experiences caused him to be a serial killer, McHale was unlucky to be 
a serial killer.  Furthermore, assuming that being a serial killer is morally blameworthy, it 
follows that McHale was also unlucky to be morally blameworthy.
2
  Although this 
argument is valid and the premises appear true, the conclusion strikes many as false.  
According to them, moral responsibility and therefore moral praise and blame are 
incompatible with luck.
3
 
 I contend that the problem with the preceding argument is the assumption that 
being a serial killer is morally blameworthy.  Although those who are responsible for 
being serial killers are morally blameworthy, it does not follow that those who are not 
responsible for being serial killers are morally blameworthy.
4
  As I see it, one is morally 
blameworthy for being a serial killer only if one is responsible for being a serial killer 
(i.e., only if one is not unlucky to be a serial killer).  Thus, McHale, who is unlucky to be 
a serial killer, is not morally blameworthy for being a serial killer on my account.
5
 
                                                 
1 Although it is not clear to me how one would put oneself at risk of suffering a psychotic break or 
becoming a serial killer, I assume that it is possible to do such a thing.  Even if it is not, the point is simply 
that there are certain morally blameworthy character traits that one can avoid developing by not putting 
oneself in certain circumstances. 
2 Because I assume that being a serial killer and being morally blameworthy are bad, I describe McHale as 
unlucky.  If, however, one believes that being a serial killer and being morally blameworthy are good, one 
would describe McHale as lucky. 
3 The suggestion that moral responsibility is incompatible with luck can be found in numerous authors (e.g., 
Augustine 1961: 33 and Reid 1983: 352).  
4 Even if it is useful to blame those who are not responsible for being serial killers, my contention is that 
they do not deserve blame.   
5 A similar argument and reply could be made regarding each of McHale’s particular actions.  For instance, 
one could argue that if McHale was unlucky to undergo the experiences he did and that undergoing those 
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 If a serial killer like McHale is not morally blameworthy, however, then who is?  
This paper attempts to answer that question.  I begin by explaining what moral luck is 
and why Thomas Nagel believes the possibility of moral assessment depends on its 
existence.  I then draw from Michael J. Zimmerman’s work to provide a counterfactual 
account of moral assessment that does not depend on the existence of moral luck.  In 
conclusion, I argue that that counterfactual account of moral assessment provides reason 
to prefer virtue ethical theories of morality to consequentialist and deontological theories.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
experiences caused him to kill a particular individual x, then McHale was unlucky to kill x.  Assuming that 
killing x is morally blameworthy, it would follow that McHale was unlucky to be morally blameworthy.  
The problem with this argument is the assumption that killing x is morally blameworthy, for although those 
who are responsible for killing x are morally blameworthy, it does not follow that those who are not 
responsible for killing x are morally blameworthy.  Instead, one is morally blameworthy for killing x only if 
one is responsible for killing x.   
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II. THE PROBLEM OF MORAL LUCK 
Nagel’s Argument 
 In the famous paper “Moral Luck,” Thomas Nagel asserts, “Prior to reflection it is 
intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault, or 
for what is due to factors beyond their control.”6  He also contends that “nothing or 
almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control.”7  Taken 
together, these statements produce an argument against the possibility of moral 
assessment. 
 
 The Problem of Moral Luck  
(P1) (The Control Principle) Agents cannot be morally assessed for what is not 
within their control. 
(P2) There is nothing within agents’ control. 
(C) Therefore, agents cannot be morally assessed. 
 
Given that the argument is valid, those hoping to deny (C) must deny either (P1) or (P2).  
In “Moral Luck,” Nagel defends (P2), thereby suggesting that others must abandon either 
the control principle by admitting that individuals can be morally assessed for what is 
beyond their control or their belief that moral assessment is possible.
8
  Because neither of 
these options is attractive, I argue that one should, if possible, deny (P2). 
                                                 
6 Nagel 2007: 355. 
7 Nagel 2007: 356. 
8 If agents can be morally assessed for what is beyond their control, then moral luck exists. 
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 In what follows, I present Nagel’s defense of (P2).  Although I admit it reveals 
that many things are beyond agents’ control, I contend that it fails to establish the 
stronger claim that everything is beyond agents’ control.  Thus, I assert that neither (P1) 
nor the possibility of moral assessment need be abandoned.  Nevertheless, I believe 
Nagel’s defense of (P2) does highlight problems with the way morality is ordinarily 
assessed.  As he points out, our basic moral attitudes, though determined by what is 
actual, are also threatened by that actuality,
9
 for if the only thing subject to moral 
assessment is what one actually has within one’s control, there is little, if anything, 
subject to moral assessment.  This makes comparative moral assessment difficult if not 
impossible.  In order to make comparative moral assessment easier, I argue that such 
assessment should be based not only on the kind of person one is and the kind of actions 
one performs, but also on the kind of person one would be and the kind of actions one 
would perform in certain counterfactual circumstances.  In other words, I contend that 
moral assessment should be based not only on an individual’s character and actions in the 
actual world, but also on his or her character and actions in certain possible worlds.   
   
Four Kinds of Moral Luck 
 In defense of (P2), Nagel presents three kinds of moral luck (viz., resultant, 
circumstantial, and constitutive luck) to illustrate that the effects of one’s action, one’s 
actions themselves, and one’s character dispositions, all of which ordinarily play a role in 
                                                 
9 Nagel 2007: 362. 
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moral assessment, are beyond one’s control.  Lastly, Nagel presents a fourth kind of 
moral luck (viz., causal luck) to illustrate that everything is beyond one’s control.   
 The first type of luck Nagel presents is resultant luck, the type of luck that is 
present whenever moral assessment is affected by “the way in which one’s actions and 
projects turn out.”10  For example, imagine a scenario in which an individual drives 
through a red light.  Although there are some cases in which the driver’s doing so might 
be harmless, there are other cases in which the driver’s doing so will be quite harmful.  
Ordinarily, the more harm one causes, the more blame one receives, so the more harm the 
driver causes (e.g., if he or she runs over a child), the more blame he or she will receive.  
Conversely, the less harm the driver causes, the less blame he or she will receive.
11
  
Assessing the driver in this way (i.e., making blame proportionate to the degree of harm 
caused), however, is to make moral assessment of the driver depend on something 
beyond his or her control, thereby violating the control principle.  Thus, insofar as the 
effects of the driver’s driving through a red light are beyond his or her control, they 
should not play a role in the way he or she is morally assessed.
12
  In the end, this 
illustrates that if the effects of an individual’s actions are beyond his or her control, moral 
assessment of him or her should not take those effects into account.
13
 
                                                 
10 Nagel 2007: 357. 
11 Ibid. 
12 There may, in some cases, be reasons to blame a driver who both drives through a red light and runs over 
a child more than a driver who simply drives through a red light.  For instance, in those cases where a 
driver both drives through a red light and runs over a child, the driver misses or ignores two “signs” not to 
drive through the red light (i.e., the red light and the child).  In those cases where a driver simply drives 
through a red light, however, the driver misses or ignores only one “sign” not to drive through the red light 
(i.e., the red light).  I assume that it is more egregious to miss or ignore two “signs” than it is to miss or 
ignore one. 
13 Although the effects of an individual’s actions should not be taken into consideration when assessing the 
morality of that individual, it does not follow that the effects of an individual’s action should never be taken 
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A second kind of luck is what Nagel calls circumstantial luck, the kind of luck 
that is present whenever moral assessment is affected by the situations one faces.  If, for 
example, whether or not one becomes a Nazi officer depends on events outside one’s 
control, circumstantial luck is present.  Nagel writes, “Someone who was an officer in a 
concentration camp might have led a quiet and harmless life if the Nazis had never come 
to power in Germany.  And someone who led a quiet and harmless life in Argentina 
might have become an officer in a concentration camp if he had not left Germany for 
business reasons in 1930.”14  This example illustrates that one’s actions often depends on 
one’s circumstances, and because one’s circumstances are often beyond one’s control, 
one’s actions are often beyond one’s control.  In such cases, one’s actions should not play 
a role in morally assessment. 
A third type of luck is what Nagel calls constitutive luck, the type of luck that is 
present whenever moral assessment is affected by one’s character dispositions.  Imagine, 
for example, an individual named Allen who is passed up for a job promotion that is 
deservedly given to Brian.  Allen, though envious of Brian, congratulates Brian 
nonetheless.
15
  According to Kant, the way in which an individual is morally assessed 
depends upon the goodness of his or her will, and the goodness of an individual’s will 
depends on whether he or she acts from duty (i.e., from the categorical imperative).
16
  To 
                                                                                                                                               
into consideration when assessing the morality of that action.  That is, the fact that the effects of a particular 
individual’s driving through a red light should not be taken into consideration when assessing the morality 
of the driver does not mean that the effects of driving through red lights should not be taken into 
consideration when assessing the morality of driving through red lights. 
14 Nagel 2007: 356. 
15 This example is drawn from Nagel 2007: 359.  I assume that because of Allen’s envy, it is impossible for 
him to offer sincere congratulations.  
16 Kant 1993: 12. 
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perform an action from duty is to perform it out of respect for the moral law, specifically 
because the maxim of that action is universalizable.
17
  Therefore, the way in which an 
individual is morally assessed on Kant’s account depends upon whether he or she 
performs his or her actions because the maxims of those actions are universalizable.  
Assuming then that Allen congratulates Brian because the maxim of his action (viz., 
congratulate those who receive deserved promotions) is universalizable, Allan acts from 
duty and therefore rightly on Kant’s account.18  According to Nagel, however, acting 
from duty is not sufficient for acting rightly, for on his account, right action requires that 
one also have the appropriate accompanying attitude.  So although Allen correctly 
congratulates Brian, Allen is nevertheless blameworthy given the wrongness of his 
envy.
19
 
Nagel goes on to contend that character dispositions, like Allen’s envy, are at 
least influenced, if not determined, by one’s biological makeup or upbringing and are 
therefore beyond one’s control.  This affects moral assessment in at least two ways.20  
First, insofar as moral evaluation of agents’ behavior depends on certain internal 
dispositions, the fact that agents’ dispositional attitudes are beyond their control makes it 
such that moral assessment will be grounded in some lucky feature of their constitution.  
                                                 
17 Kant 1993: 13. 
18 According to Kant, simply acting in accordance with duty is not sufficient for right action (Kant 1993: 
10). 
19 Nagel 2007: 359.   
20 This affects moral assessment in at least two ways because at least two kinds of character dispositions 
influence moral assessment.  On one hand, there are internal dispositions.  Internal dispositions are 
dispositions to have certain attitudes.  For example, some individuals are more envious than others, a fact 
that influences the way they are morally assessed.  On the other hand, there are external dispositions.  
External dispositions are dispositions to perform certain actions.  For example, some individuals take more 
risks than others, a fact that will influence their behavior and therefore the way they are morally assessed.  I 
use the word “constitution” and the phrase “character dispositions” to refer to both kinds of dispositions. 
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Moral assessment of Allen, for example, is grounded in a lucky feature of his constitution 
insofar as his envy is a product of his genes or the way in which he was raised.  Second, 
because moral evaluation of agents depends on their actions and agents’ actions depend 
on certain external dispositions, the fact that agents’ external dispositions are beyond 
their control makes it such that moral assessment of agents will be grounded in some 
lucky feature of their constitution.  For example, an individual disposed to alcoholism 
will have less control over his or her drinking than an individual not disposed to 
alcoholism, and insofar as the excessive drinking caused by alcoholism diminishes one’s 
control over one’s actions, the individual disposed to alcoholism will have less control his 
or her actions than the individual not disposed to alcoholism.  Thus, moral assessment of 
the individual disposed to alcoholism will, at least in part, be grounded in a lucky feature 
of his or her constitution.  Ultimately, however, because individuals should not be 
morally assessed for what is beyond their control and their constitutions or character 
dispositions are beyond their control, moral assessment should not be grounded in their 
constitutions or character dispositions. 
The fourth and final kind of luck presented by Nagel is causal luck, the kind of 
luck that is present insofar as the will and therefore all human action is causally 
determined.  As Nagel points out, “Everything seems to result from the combined 
influence of factors, antecedent and posterior to action, that are not within the agent’s 
control.”21  If, as the control principle suggests, agents cannot be morally assessed for 
                                                 
21 Nagel 2007: 360. 
Spelman, Jonathan, 2010, UMSL, p. 14 
what is beyond their control and everything is beyond their control, then agents cannot be 
morally assessed.   
 
Conclusion 
 Given the control principle on which agents cannot be held responsible for what is 
not within their control, the existence of resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive luck 
requires abandoning the way individuals are ordinarily morally assessed.  Moreover, the 
existence of causal luck requires abandoning moral assessment altogether.  Thus, on 
Nagel’s account, preserving the possibility of moral assessment requires one to reject the 
control principle.  In other words, preserving the possibility of moral assessment requires 
holding agents responsible for things that are not within their control.  In what follows, I 
argue that preserving moral assessment does not require holding agents responsible for 
things that are not within their control.  Then, after providing a counterfactual theory of 
moral assessment that can handle the problems posed by resultant, circumstantial, and 
constitutive luck, I contend that that theory provides reasons to prefer virtue ethical 
theories of morality to consequentialist or deontological theories.  
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III. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
In a paper entitled “Taking Luck Seriously,” Michael J. Zimmerman attempts to 
explain how both the control principle and the possibility of moral assessment can be 
preserved in spite of the worries caused by luck.  Recognizing that moral responsibility is 
incompatible with luck, Zimmerman admits that one should not be held morally 
responsible for those character dispositions, actions, or effects that are beyond one’s 
control.  Realizing, however, that there is a great deal beyond one’s control, Zimmerman 
expands the scope of one’s responsibility by arguing that one can be held morally 
responsible for the character dispositions one would have had, actions one would have 
performed, and effects one would have produced, had they not been beyond one’s 
control.  In other words, Zimmerman argues that even if an individual is not morally 
responsible for his or her actual character dispositions, actions, or effects because they 
are beyond his or her control, he or she is, nevertheless, responsible for his or her 
counterfactual character dispositions, actions, and effects. 
To accomplish this, Zimmerman begins by draws two distinctions, one between 
three kinds of judgments (viz., aretaic, deontic, and hypological judgments) and another 
between the degree and scope of one’s responsibility.  By drawing a distinction between 
aretaic, deontic, and hypological judgments, Zimmerman is able to separate questions 
about virtuous character and right action from questions about responsibility.  Then, by 
focusing in on questions about responsibility, Zimmerman is able to argue, contra Nagel, 
Spelman, Jonathan, 2010, UMSL, p. 16 
that it is possible to preserve both the possibility of moral assessment and the control 
principle. 
 
Aretaic, Deontic, and Hypological Judgments 
In order to preserve both the possibility of moral assessment and the control 
principle in spite of the problems posed by luck, Zimmerman begins by distinguishing 
aretaic and deontic judgments from hypological ones.
22
  Aretaic judgments, according to 
Zimmerman, are judgments about character, particularly virtue and vice.
23
  Thus, aretaic 
judgments are made of individuals, and the making of such judgments requires the 
evaluation of one’s character dispositions.  For example, an individual disposed to saving 
drowning swimmers is deemed virtuous while an individual disposed to ignoring them is 
deemed vicious. 
Deontic judgments are judgments about actions, particularly their rightness and 
wrongness.
24
  Thus, deontic judgments are made of behaviors, and the making of such 
judgments requires the evaluation of the way actions are produced and the effects that 
result.  Saving a drowning swimmer, for example, is deemed right while ignoring a 
drowning swimmer is deemed wrong. 
                                                 
22 Zimmerman 2002: 554. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Zimmerman claims that “deontic judgments constitute a type of act evaluation,” but he also claims that 
they constitute a type of agent evaluation (Ibid.).  While I agree with Zimmerman’s suggestion that deontic 
judgments constitute a type of act evaluation, I disagree with his suggestion that they also constitute a type 
of agent evaluation. 
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Finally, hypological judgments are judgments about responsibility, particularly 
laudability and culpability.
25
  Zimmerman himself introduces the word “hypological,” 
which he draws from the Greek word “ύπόλογος” meaning “held accountable or liable.”26  
Hypological judgments, like aretaic judgments, are made of individuals, and the making 
of such judgments requires the evaluation of one’s control.  More specifically, the 
making of such judgments requires determining whether or not an individual has control 
over a particular thing and, if he or she does, determining the extent to which he or she 
has control over that thing.  Hypological judgments can be made about individuals with 
respect to their character dispositions or their behaviors.  Consequently, hypological 
judgments can be made about virtue and vice or right and wrong action.  For example, 
whether one has the disposition to save drowning swimmers may or may not be within 
one’s control.  If it is, then one is laudable for having it and culpable for not.  If it is not, 
then one is neither laudable nor culpable either way.  Similarly, whether one saves a 
drowning swimmer may or may not be within one’s control.  If it is, then one is laudable 
for doing so and culpable for not.  If it is not, then one is neither laudable nor culpable 
either way. 
 
Degree and Scope of Responsibility 
Having distinguished between aretaic, deontic, and hypological judgments, 
Zimmerman turns his attention to distinguishing between degree and scope of 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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responsibility.
27
  To do so, Zimmerman presents an example in which two assassins, 
Georg and George, plot to kill Henrik and Henry respectively.
28
  Zimmerman assumes 
that the mental and physical lives of Georg and George are identical and that the only 
difference between the two is that the bullet Georg fires at Henrik hits and kills a bird 
while the bullet George fires at Henry hits and kills Henry.  Although it is clear, 
according to Zimmerman, that George is responsible for something that Georg is not (i.e., 
the death of a person), it does not follow that that George is any more blameworthy than 
Georg.  In fact, given that the only differences between the two assassins are the effects 
of their actions, something outside their control, Zimmerman is inclined to describe them 
as equally blameworthy.
29
 
In order to explain how the two men could be equally blameworthy when one is 
responsible for killing a man and the other is not, Zimmerman draws a distinction 
between degree and scope of responsibility.  On Zimmerman’s account, one’s degree of 
responsibility depends on the degree of control one has over a particular characteristic of 
the world (e.g., one’s character dispositions, circumstances, actions, or the effects of 
one’s actions).30  In the example, Georg and George are described as having identical 
mental and physical lives.  I take it that Zimmerman also assumes that they arrive at their 
identical mental and physical lives by identical processes.  So, assuming Georg and 
George freely choose to be assassins, the two not only have the same degree of control 
                                                 
27 Zimmerman 2002: 560. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Zimmerman 2002: 562.  Here I have noted that one’s actions themselves might be beyond one’s control 
(e.g., in those cases where one misspeaks).  Although Nagel and Zimmerman ignore this possibility, 
Santiago Amaya brought it to my attention.  
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over their becoming assassins but also have some non-zero degree of control over their 
becoming assassins, for insofar as Georg and George are free to be assassins, they can 
avoid becoming assassins.  If scientists program Georg and George to be assassins, 
however, then although the two have the same degree of control over their becoming 
assassins, they do not have some non-zero degree of control over their becoming 
assassins, for insofar as Georg and George are programmed to be assassins, they cannot 
avoid becoming assassins.   
Whereas one’s degree of responsibility depends on the degree of control one has 
over a particular characteristic of the world, one’s scope of responsibility depends on 
what characteristics of the world one has control over.
31
  In Zimmerman’s example, 
Georg and George are assumed to have the same, non-zero degree control over their 
character dispositions, circumstances, and actions.  Thus, the scope of their control 
extends to their character dispositions, circumstances and actions.  The question, 
however, is whether the scope of their control extends to the effects of their actions. 
Whether one believes Georg and George have control over the effects of their 
actions will depend on one’s theory of responsibility.  As I see it, what it means for one to 
have control over the effects of one’s actions is for the actual effects of one’s actions to 
match up with one’s intended effects.32  On this view, because Georg fails to kill, the 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Earlier I argued that one is not morally responsible for what is beyond one’s control, and here I argue that 
one’s effects are beyond one’s control unless they match up with one’s intended effects.  Thus, my account 
of moral responsibility entails that individuals are not morally responsible for the unintended effects of 
their actions.  For example, my account of moral responsibility entails that individuals are not morally 
responsible for unintentionally driving through red lights, even if their doing so causes injury to others.  
Given that unintentionally driving through red lights is blameworthy, however, especially when doing so 
causes injury to others, one might object to my account of moral responsibility.  In response, I would admit 
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effects of Georg’s action are not under his control.  Alternatively, because George 
succeeds in killing Henry, the effects of George’s action are under his control. 
Because I believe that what it means for one to have control over the effects of 
one’s actions is for the effects of one’s actions to match up with one’s intended effects, I 
believe that what it means for one to have control over one’s constitution is for one’s 
constitution to match up with one’s intended constitution.  Similarly, what it means for 
one to have control over one’s circumstances is for one’s circumstances to match up with 
one’s intended circumstances, and what it means for one to have control over one’s 
actions is for one’s actions to match up with one’s intended actions.   
 
Moral Responsibility 
Because the purpose of moral assessment is to determine one’s laudability or 
culpability,
33
 and because one cannot be laudable or culpable for something that is 
beyond one’s control,34 determining one’s laudability or culpability requires determining 
what is within one’s control.  Hypological judgments serve this function by picking out 
the scope and degree of one’s control and therefore the scope and degree of one’s 
responsibility.   
                                                                                                                                               
that unintentionally driving through red lights is blameworthy but contend that it is not morally but 
epistemically blameworthy.  I believe this holds true for all unintentional negligent acts.  Assuming I am 
right about that, my account of moral responsibility need not hold individuals responsible for the 
unintended effects of their actions in order to explain the blameworthiness of unintentional negligent acts. 
33 Although I am working under the assumption that this is the sole purpose of moral assessment, I am 
willing to admit that there may be others. 
34 Though inappropriate, it is pragmatic to praise or blame an individual whose behavior is beyond his 
control provided praising or blaming him is capable of altering his future behavior.  In such cases, however, 
the object of praise or blame is the action, not the individual.  Individuals are the appropriate object of 
praise or blame only in those cases where their behavior is within their control. 
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Judgments about the scope of one’s control pick out what one is responsible for.  
If a particular disposition, action, or effect is beyond one’s control, then one is not 
responsible for it.  If a particular disposition, action, or effect is within the scope of one’s 
control, however, then one is responsible for it.  Thus, if a particular disposition, action, 
or effect is beyond one’s control, then that disposition, action, or effect should not play a 
role in the way one is morally assessed.  If, however, a particular disposition, action, or 
effect is within one’s control, then that disposition, action, or effect should play a role in 
the way one is morally assessed.  Consequently, an individual is subject to moral 
assessment only if there is at least one disposition, action, or effect that is not beyond his 
or her control.  The more dispositions, actions, and effects that are within one’s control, 
the more dispositions, actions, and effects one is responsible for.   
Judgments about the degree of one’s control pick out the degree to which one is 
responsible for those dispositions, actions, and effects within one’s control.  If a 
particular disposition, action, or effect is beyond one’s control, then one does not have a 
non-zero degree of control over it.  If, however, a particular disposition, action, or effect 
is within one’s control, then one does have a non-zero degree of control over it.  The 
greater the amount of control one has over a particular disposition, action, or effect, the 
greater the degree of control one has over that disposition, action, or effect.  What is 
more, the greater the degree of control one has over a disposition, action, or effect, the 
greater the influence that disposition, action, or effect has on the way one is morally 
assessed. 
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Because aretaic and deontic judgments cannot be made about agents whose 
dispositions, actions, and effects are beyond their control,
35
 hypological judgments must 
be made prior to aretaic and deontic judgments.  Thus, hypological judgments play a 
crucial role in moral assessment.  Nevertheless, the mere fact that an agent has control 
over a particular characteristic of the world does not mean that the agent’s relationship to 
that characteristic of the world is a morally significant one.  For example, although an 
individual might have control over when and how he eats a particular bowl of ice cream, 
it is not the case that his or her decision is therefore morally significant. 
Ordinarily, the character dispositions one has, the actions one performs, and the 
effects one produces are all morally relevant features of one’s life.  The circumstances or 
situations one faces, however, are not.  The reason for this is that the situations one faces 
are unforeseen, unintended, or intended effects of one’s actions.  If they are unforeseen or 
unintended effects of one’s actions, then they are beyond one’s control, and one is not 
responsible for them.  If they are intended effects of one’s actions, however, then one is 
already responsible for them as effects.  Assuming, therefore, that one is responsible for 
the effects of one’s actions, one should not also be responsible for the situations one 
faces, for if one were, then one would be responsible for the situations one faces qua 
effects and qua situations.  Thus, I assume that the situations one faces (i.e., one’s 
circumstances) should not be evaluated in moral assessment to avoid double counting. 
In the end, the morally relevant features of one’s life are one’s character 
dispositions, one’s actions, and the effects of one’s actions, provided these things are 
                                                 
35 I will argue for this claim later. 
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within one’s control.36  These morally relevant features of one’s life play a determining 
role in comparative moral assessment, and therefore comparative moral assessment of 
any two individuals having the same non-zero degree of control over these features of a 
world is relatively straightforward.  Imagine, for example, two brothers, Daniel and 
David, each of whom has a rock and control over whether or not he throws that rock at 
his brother.  Because the scope and degree of their responsibility is identical, any 
difference in their behavior will generate a difference in the way they are morally 
assessed.  Consequently, if Daniel throws his rock at David while David refrains, the two 
brothers will be assessed differently.     
Although comparative moral assessment of any two individuals having the same 
non-zero degree of control over certain characteristics of the world is relatively 
straightforward, comparative moral assessment of any two individuals not having the 
same non-zero degree of control over certain characteristics of a world is significantly 
less so.  The purpose of the following section is to demonstrate that such assessment, 
though difficult, is nevertheless possible, and to do so, I draw on Zimmerman’s 
discussion of how to conduct moral assessment in cases of resultant, circumstantial, and 
constitutive luck. 
                                                 
36 Zimmerman disagrees with this assessment, writing, “I have said that I subscribe to the view that we 
cannot be responsible for what is not in our control . . . In my view . . . an agent exercises control directly 
over his choices . . . and indirectly over the consequences of his choices” (Zimmerman 2002: 564).  On 
Zimmerman’s account, therefore, the only morally relevant features of one’s life are one’s choices.  As a 
result, Zimmerman argues that individuals are either responsible for their choices or responsible “tout 
court,” where to be responsible tout court is not to be responsible “for anything” but to be responsible “in 
virtue of something” (Zimmerman 2002: 564-565 [emphasis in original]).  Thus, Zimmerman contends that 
individuals are responsible not for their dispositions to choose wrongly but rather in virtue of their 
dispositions to choose wrongly.  In the end, it seems that the disagreement between Zimmerman and me on 
this issue is verbal.  Nevertheless, I should note that I do not intend for my account of moral responsibility 
to be identical to Zimmerman’s but only to follow his in certain significant respects. 
Spelman, Jonathan, 2010, UMSL, p. 24 
 
 
IV. A THEORY OF MORAL ASSESSMENT 
Resultant Luck 
The existence of resultant luck makes it such that moral assessment should not be 
influenced by the uncontrolled effects of one’s actions.  Nevertheless, I see no reason 
why moral assessment should not be influenced by the controlled effects of one’s actions 
or the counterfactual effects one’s actions would produce were they controlled. 
In arguing for this position, I want to return to Zimmerman’s example of the two 
assassins, Georg and George, both of whom not only have the same non-zero degree of 
control over their constitutions, circumstances, and actions but also have identical 
constitutions, face identical circumstances, and perform identical actions.
37
  Were Georg 
and George to have the same non-zero degree of control over the effects of their actions 
and produce the same effects, it would be appropriate for one to assess the two assassins 
identically.  Georg and George do not have the same non-zero degree of control over the 
effect of their actions, however, for although the scope of Georg’s control, and therefore 
his responsibility, does not extend to the effects of his action, George’s does.  What is 
more, the actions performed by Georg and George do not have the same effects, for 
although Georg does not kill his target, George does.   
                                                 
37 Throughout the paper, the word “action” refers to a behavior directed at an end.  Therefore, two 
individuals who behave identically in pursuit of identical ends are described as acting identically even if 
only one of the two achieves his or her end.  Consequently, Georg and Georg are described as acting 
identically even though only George achieves his end. 
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These dissimilarities between Georg and George make it unclear how to assess 
the two in comparison with one another.  As I see it, there are at least three options.  First, 
one could simply ignore the effects produced by the assassins, choosing to base moral 
assessment of the two on their character dispositions and actions, which are within their 
control.  The virtue of this method of assessment is that it deems Georg and George 
equally culpable, which seems appropriate.  The problem with this method of moral 
assessment, however, is that it ignores morally relevant information, particularly the fact 
that George kills Henry. 
While I admit that being disposed to kill and attempting to kill are blameworthy, 
it seems that what makes them blameworthy is the fact that they actually result in killing.  
Consequently, I take it that if being disposed to kill or attempting to kill did not result in 
killing, each would seem significantly less blameworthy.  Thus, I contend that George’s 
killing Henry is an important fact that should not be ignored. 
  This problem with the first method of moral assessment motivates a second.  The 
second method does not ignore effects of George’s action because they are within his 
control, but it does ignore the effects of Georg’s action, which are not.  On this method of 
moral assessment, George would be responsible for his character, actions, and effects 
while Georg would only be responsible for his character and actions.  The virtue of this 
method is that it takes into account the fact that George kills Henry.  In taking that 
information into account, however, this method makes moral assessment of the two 
assassins incommensurable.   
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When Georg and George are compared simply with respect to their characters and 
actions, it is clear why they are equally culpable.  When the fact that George is 
responsible for killing Henry is added to that information, it is no longer clear whether 
Georg and George should be assessed identically.  The fact that George is responsible for 
killing Henry seems to make him more culpable than Georg, but if George is more 
culpable than Georg, then one must abandon the intuitively plausible suggestion that the 
two should be assessed identically.  Ultimately, it is unclear what to do with the 
additional fact that George is responsible for killing Henry.  Were there a comparable fact 
about Georg’s responsibility, then George’s responsibility for killing Henry would not be 
problematic, but lacking such a fact, it is.
38
   
The problem with the second method of moral assessment leads to a third and 
final method that takes into account not only the effects of George’s action but also the 
counterfactual effects of Georg’s action, specifically the effects George would have 
produced had they been within his control.  On this method of moral assessment, the 
character, actions, and effects (i.e., Georg’s counterfactual effects and George’s actual 
effects) of both assassins would undergo evaluation.  This view not only captures the 
intuition that Georg and George are equally culpable but also has the benefit of grounding 
their culpability in effects rather than in character dispositions or actions themselves.  
This view also alleviates the problem with the second view by providing an equal amount 
of information about both assassins on which to base comparative moral assessment.   
                                                 
38 This problem might be epistemic, for the fact that there is more information about how to assess George 
than there is about how to assess Georg makes it easier to assess George than Georg, but it does not 
necessarily make the former any more culpable than the latter.   
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The method of assessment I have advanced here is capable of accurately capturing 
one’s intuitions about moral laudability and culpability not only in the case described but 
also other cases such as the one described earlier in which two individuals drive through 
red lights but only one of the two hits a child.  In that case, although only one of the 
drivers hits a child, the two are nevertheless equally blameworthy in the same way that 
Georg and George are equally blameworthy insofar as their actions would produce 
similar effects in counterfactual situations. 
 
Circumstantial Luck 
The existence of circumstantial luck makes it such that moral assessment should 
not be influenced by the uncontrolled actions one performs.  However, I see no reason 
why moral assessment should not be influenced by the controlled actions one performs or 
the counterfactual actions one would perform were one in control of them. 
To explain why, I want to consider an example similar to Zimmerman’s original 
example but altered in such a way that Georg is no longer resultantly lucky but 
circumstantially lucky.  In the example, Georg not only fails to kill Henrik but also fails 
to fire at Henrik because of a sudden urge to sneeze or because an object blocks his line 
of sight.
39
   
Although this new example introduces an additional difference between Georg 
and George, Zimmerman argues that the two remain equally culpable,
40
 for although the 
scope of George’s responsibility extends beyond the scope of Georg’s, both have the 
                                                 
39 Zimmerman 2002: 563. 
40 Ibid. 
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same non-zero degree of control over their character dispositions from which they form 
the intention to kill their respective targets.  According to Zimmerman, the fact that both 
Georg and George have the same non-zero degree of control over their character 
dispositions is enough to ensure that the counterfactual scenario in which Georg has 
control over his character dispositions, actions, and effects is one in which Georg kills 
Henrik in the same way George kills Henry.  Moreover, Zimmerman believes that this 
counterfactual similarity is enough to indicate that the two should be assessed identically.   
The method Zimmerman uses to deal with circumstantial luck in the case at hand 
is also capable of dealing with circumstantial luck in Nagel’s example where one of two 
individuals disposed to become Nazi officers avoids doing so only by moving to 
Argentina in 1930.  According to Zimmerman, one who avoids becoming a Nazi officer 
only by moving to Argentina is no less blameworthy than one who actually become a 
Nazi officer, provided, of course, that the reason for one’s move is not to avoid becoming 
a Nazi officer.
41
  Although there might be resistance to this claim, I believe that such 
resistance might be alleviated in one of two ways.  First, one could make the example 
more precise.  Second, rather than suggesting that the individual who moves to Argentina 
is no less blameworthy than the Nazi officer, one could suggest that the Nazi officer is no 
more blameworthy than the individual who moves to Argentina.  When Emily Prentiss 
(i.e., a character from Criminal Minds presented earlier), for example, recognizes that she 
might have become a serial killer had she undergone the same events undergone by Jonny 
                                                 
41 An individual who recognizes that he or she is disposed to act wrongly in certain situations is right to 
avoid such situations.  Thus, an individual who recognizes that he or she is disposed to become a Nazi 
officer and that becoming a Nazi officer is wrong is right to leaving Germany as the Nazis are coming to 
power. 
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McHale, she does not think of herself as being as guilty as him but rather thinks of him as 
being as innocent as herself.   
This example seems to vindicate the intuition that victims of circumstantial luck 
are no more or less culpable than those who are not, and because I am inclined to think 
that serial killers and Nazi officers are blameworthy rather than praiseworthy, I am also 
inclined to think that those who avoid becoming Nazi officers only by moving to 
Argentina are blameworthy rather than praiseworthy. 
 
Constitutive Luck 
The existence of constitutive luck makes it such that moral assessment should not 
be influenced by one’s uncontrolled character dispositions.  However, I see no reason 
why moral assessment should not be influenced by one’s controlled character 
dispositions or the counterfactual character dispositions one would have were one in 
control of them. 
To explain why this is, I want to look at another example similar to Zimmerman’s 
original but altered in such a way that Georg and George are no longer assassins but 
simply enemies of Henrik and Henry.  In this new case, Georg is levelheaded such that, 
when tormented by Henrik, he is unprovoked.  George, however, is hotheaded such that, 
when tormented by Henry, he is provoked.  Because of this constitutive difference 
between the two, Georg does not form the intention to kill Henrik whereas George does 
form the intention to kill Henry.  The question Zimmerman faces is how to make a 
comparative moral assessment of Georg and George when Georg, unlike George, refrains 
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not only from killing or firing at but also from forming the intention to kill his 
tormentor.
42
  Before responding to this question, however, I first want to get clear about 
the example. 
According to Zimmerman, Georg is levelheaded and George is hotheaded.  Now, 
if both individuals have control over these character traits, it would not be a case of 
constitutive luck, for luck exists only if at least one of their character traits is beyond their 
control.  In order to preserve the similarity between this case and the previous cases, I 
assume that Georg does not have control over his character trait of levelheadedness while 
George does have control over his hotheadedness.
43
 
Like Zimmerman’s explanation of how to preserve moral assessment in the face 
of resultant and circumstantial luck, Zimmerman’s explanation of how to preserve moral 
assessment in the face of constitutive luck appeals to the counterfactual situation in which 
Georg has control over the relevant character trait.  If Georg would kill Henrik were he to 
have control over the relevant character trait, then he is culpable for doing so.
44
  If Georg 
would not kill Henrik were he to have control over the relevant character trait, then he is 
not culpable for doing so. 
                                                 
42 Zimmerman 2002: 563-564. 
43 Although Zimmerman does not spell out why Georg does not have control over whether he is 
levelheaded, there are several reasons why Georg might not have control over his levelheadedness.  For 
example, it might be that Georg was raised by very levelheaded parents such that, even if he had been 
genetically disposed to being hotheaded, he could not have helped but be levelheaded.  It might also be that 
Georg was genetically disposed to being levelheaded such that, even if he had been raised by hotheaded 
parents, he could not have helped but be levelheaded.  Because such cases are plausible, the suggestion that 
Georg’s being levelheaded could be beyond his control is also plausible. 
44 I assume that one’s constitution or character dispositions are ordinarily controlled through habituation, 
but I imagine that there are cases in which one’s constitution changes more rapidly.  If, for example, Jonny 
McHale’s case is one of rapid character destruction, there are likely cases of rapid character construction 
where one develops good dispositions from particularly significant events.  To what degree individuals 
have control over rapid character destruction and construction, however, is unclear. 
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For the most part, the problems for moral assessment posed by constitutive luck 
mirror those problems posed by resultant and circumstantial luck.  Consequently, 
Zimmerman assumes that anyone who accepts his explanation of how to preserve moral 
assessment in the face of resultant and circumstantial luck will also accept his 
explanation of how to preserve moral assessment in the face of constitutive luck.  While I 
generally agree with that suggestion, I believe there are several concerns unique to 
constitutive luck, which I will deal with in turn. 
First, there is an issue that I touched on earlier when presenting constitutive luck, 
specifically the fact that it comes in two distinct forms, internal and external.  Internal 
luck is a kind of constitutive luck that affects one’s attitudes without also affecting one’s 
behaviors, so it plays a role in moral assessment only insofar as one’s attitudes play a role 
in moral assessment.  The case presented earlier in which an envious individual, Allen, 
congratulates Brian is a case of attitudinal luck insofar as Allen’s envy, which is beyond 
his control, influences the way in which he is morally assessed but does not influence his 
behavior.  Now, there might be some debate over the role attitudes play a role in moral 
assessment.  I would argue that an individual who is passed up for a deserved promotion 
should be upset to some degree and that being upset to a lesser or greater degree is 
morally wrong.  It could also be argued, however, that being upset to a lesser or greater 
degree is not morally wrong but wrong in some other sense.  Regardless of which view is 
correct, I think it is fair to say that one’s attitudes are subject to normative evaluation.  
Thus, one is subject to internal luck anytime one’s attitude (e.g., the degree to which one 
is upset) depends on factors beyond one’s control (e.g., one’s biological characteristics). 
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External luck is a kind of constitutive luck that affects one’s behavior and 
therefore plays a role in moral assessment insofar as one’s behavior plays a role in moral 
assessment.  Imagine, for example, a case in which an individual is taught by his or her 
parents to have no regard for the property of others and is therefore disposed to steal.  
This is a case of external luck insofar the individual’s dispositions, though beyond his or 
her control, influence the way he or she is morally assessed.
45
  Because behavior plays a 
role in moral assessment, one is subject to external luck anytime one’s behavioral 
dispositions depend on factors beyond one’s control (e.g., one’s upbringing). 
As I have suggested, Nagel’s example of constitutive luck is one in which Allen’s 
envy undermines his moral goodness and therefore seems to be a case of internal luck.  
The example Zimmerman presents in response to Nagel, however, is one in which 
George’s hotheadedness affects his behavior and is therefore a case of external luck.  
Thus, whereas Allen is blameworthy on account of his envy, an internal disposition, 
George is blameworthy on account of his hotheadedness, an external disposition.
46
   
Given this disanalogy, one might contend that Zimmerman’s response does not 
get at Nagel’s worry.  One might claim, for instance, that Zimmerman’s theory of moral 
assessment fails because it is unable to differentiate between the laudability and 
culpability of agents who perform similar actions but who have different attitudes.  While 
Zimmerman does not explain how to differentiate between the laudability and culpability 
of agents who perform similar actions but who have different attitudes, it is relatively 
                                                 
45 Another case of external luck would be one in which an individual is taught to use violence to solve his 
or her disagreements.  
46 I imagine one could argue that hotheadedness is not an external disposition but an internal one, albeit an 
internal disposition that also influences behavior.  If that is the case, then there is no disanalogy between 
the two examples. 
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clear how Zimmerman would do so.  Zimmerman could, for example, adapt his case in 
such a way that Georg and George act similarly but form different attitudes, with Georg’s 
attitude being appropriate but beyond his control and George’s attitude being 
inappropriate and within his control.  According to the model Zimmerman presents, the 
relevant question is whether Georg’s attitude would be appropriate were it within his 
control.  If it would be, then Georg is not blameworthy for it, but if it would not be, then 
Georg is blameworthy for it. 
Given that there are two kinds of constitutive luck, internal and external, it can 
legitimately be asked how the two relate to one another.  In particular, it can be asked 
whether attitudes cause, influence, or simply run alongside behaviors.  When I 
distinguished internal and external luck, I assumed that the two could come apart.  That 
is, I assumed that certain attitudes (e.g., anger) are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
related behaviors (e.g., acts of retribution).  If that is the case, then a lack of control over 
one’s attitudes is neither necessary nor sufficient for a lack of control over one’s 
behaviors, and attitudes simply run alongside behaviors.  Thus, it is possible to simply 
separate internal luck from external luck.  Now, it is possible that the two do not come 
apart and that the distinction therefore collapses.  Even if that is the case, however, I do 
not think that speaks against Zimmerman’s account but only a certain way of applying it.  
A second issue unique to constitutive luck is that its existence might entail the 
existence of causal luck, for if one’s actions and the effects of one’s actions flow directly 
from one’s character dispositions, then one who lacks control over one’s character 
dispositions also lacks control over one’s actions and the effects of one’s actions.  
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Obviously, Zimmerman need not admit that constitutive luck is that widespread, for just 
as the fact that resultant luck exists from time to time does not imply that it exists all the 
time, so too the fact that constitutive luck exists from time to time does not imply that it 
exists all the time.  In other words, the fact that some of one’s character dispositions are 
beyond one’s control does not entail that all of one’s character dispositions are beyond 
one’s control. 
 
Causal Luck 
If one’s actions and the effects of one’s actions flow directly from one’s character 
dispositions and one’s character dispositions are determined by genetic, environmental, 
or any other number of factors beyond one’s control, then one’s behavior is causally 
determined, and one cannot be responsible for anything.  Furthermore, if one cannot be 
responsible for anything, then one cannot be laudable or culpable for any of one’s 
behavior.   
Establishing whether or not human behavior is causally determined is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  I am therefore content to admit that if human behavior is causally 
determined, no one is laudable or culpable for anything.  Although Zimmerman attempts 
to avoid making this admission by contending that causally determined individuals are 
responsible for the counterfactual behavior of their free counterparts, this contention is 
dubious.
47
  While the truth of causal determinism does not rule out the possibility of 
                                                 
47 Zimmerman 2002: 567. 
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one’s having free counterparts,48 it is wrong to think that an actually existing, causally 
determined individual could be responsible for the behavior of a possible counterpart.  
Assuming that the control principle is true, moral responsibility requires control.  Thus, 
causally determined individuals, who have no control over their free counterparts, cannot 
be responsible for the behavior of their free counterparts. 
For example, Zimmerman would say that even if John Wilkes Booth is causally 
determined to kill Abraham Lincoln, he is nevertheless culpable for doing so insofar as a 
counterpart of his freely kills Lincoln in some possible world.  If causal determinism is 
true, however, then whether or not a counterpart of John Wilkes Booth’s freely kills 
Lincoln in some possible world is beyond John Wilkes Booth’s control, and because one 
cannot be responsible for what is beyond one’s control, John Wilkes Booth cannot be 
responsible for his counterpart’s behavior. 
Although I admit that if causal determinism is true, no one is laudable or culpable 
for anything, I assume for the sake of argument that causal determinism is false.  In fact, 
there seem to be good reasons for doing so, for as Nagel admits, “We are unable to view 
ourselves simply as portions of the world, and from inside we have a rough idea of the 
boundary between what is us and what is not, what we do and what happens to us, what is 
our personality and what is an accidental handicap.”49  Although individuals may be 
inclined to overestimate the amount of control they have over their character dispositions 
and actions, it is counterintuitive to think that they do not have any such control. 
 
                                                 
48 Here I have followed Horgan 1979: 345-358. 
49 Nagel 2007: 361. 
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Objections
50
 
 The theory of moral assessment that has been presented is a counterfactual one, 
and the purpose of advancing such a theory is to enable comparative moral assessment of 
two or more individuals where at least one of them does not have control over some 
characteristic of the world.  I believe that the theory is up to that task.  Nevertheless, there 
are several objections one might make to the theory that I would like to address before 
moving on. 
 First, there is the worry that counterfactual facts about one’s character, actions, 
and effects are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to know.  In response, I admit that it 
may be impossible to know the kind of person one would be, the actions one would 
perform, or the effects one would produce were one in control of those things.  However, 
I do not believe that it is essential that these facts be knowable in order for the theory in 
question to be the appropriate method of moral assessment.  That is, one need not know 
how two agents stand in relation to one another morally in order for one to know that 
there is a fact of the matter about how the two agents stand in relation to one another 
morally.  For example, one may not know whether there are more hairs on his head than 
on his brother’s, but he nevertheless knows that either there are more hairs on his head 
than on his brother’s or there are not.  Similarly, one need not know whether Georg 
would have fired at Henrik had an object not moved into his line of sight in order to know 
                                                 
50 The preceding arguments were presented at the 2010 Ohio Philosophical Association’s Annual Meeting, 
and the following objections came out of the ensuing discussion.  I am therefore grateful to all those who 
attended my presentation, particularly Brian Domino, for helping me develop my view. 
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that there is a fact of the matter about whether Georg would have fired at Henrik had an 
object not moved into his line of sight. 
 A second worry is that if causal determinism is false, there is no fact of the matter 
whether Georg would have fired at Henrik had an object not moved into his line of sight.  
While it seems to me that Georg would have fired at Henrik had an object not moved into 
his line of sight, I admit that that intuition, at least in part, depends on the assumption that 
George had already formed the intention to fire at Henrik.  If I assume that George had 
not already formed the intention to fire at Henrik, I am admittedly less likely to think that 
there is a fact of the matter whether Georg would have fired at Henrik had an object not 
moved into his line of sight. 
 Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that causal determinism need not be true in 
order for there to be counterfactual facts.  If you put someone in a situation other than the 
one he or she is in, he or she is going to act, and that act is going to be determined by him 
or her, not by physical facts about him or her.  Imagine, for example, that Edward is 
injured in a car accident but that had Edward not been injured in a car accident, he would 
have come across a beggar.  Now, Edward has character dispositions that influence how 
he responds to beggars, and in most cases these dispositions are sufficient to determine 
his response.  For example, maybe he makes it a point to always give beggars money.  If 
that is the case, then there is a fact about what he would do in the counterfactual situation.  
If, however, he does not make it a point to always give beggars money, then it is possible 
that on the particular day in question his character dispositions do not incline him one 
way or another.  That is, maybe the degree to which he is disposed to give a particular 
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beggar money is identical to the degree to which he is disposed not to give that beggar 
money.  Now, assuming that there is a fact of the matter whether Edward’s giving the 
beggar money is right or wrong and that the scenario in question is one in which giving 
the beggar money is right, then the more Edward’s character dispositions incline him to 
give the beggar money, the better he is, qua moral agent.  Consequently, if his character 
dispositions do not incline him one way or another, Edward is neither the best nor the 
worst agent he could be.  He is somewhere between those extremes.  Thus, even if there 
is no fact of the matter whether Edward would give the beggar money, it is still possible 
to compare his character dispositions to those of some other individual.  If, for example, 
that other individual is disposed to give the beggar money, Edward is worse than him or 
her.  If, however, that other individual is disposed not to give the beggar money, Edward 
is better than him or her. 
 Maybe I have yet to alleviate the worry.  Suppose one admits that the falsity of 
causal determinism does not prevent certain facts about nearby possible worlds from 
being true or that, even if it does, the falsity of causal determinism does not prevent the 
possibility of morally assessing such worlds.  One could still argue that the falsity of 
causal determinism does prevent certain facts about remote possible worlds from being 
true or that, even if it does not do that, it at least prevents the possibility of morally 
assessing such worlds.  The problem, one might argue, is that drastically changing an 
individual’s constitution or circumstances makes that individual into an entirely different 
person. 
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 Consider an example.  Imagine that Cassie and Danielle are raised in 
extraordinarily different circumstances.  Cassie is one of seven children cared for by her 
single mother in a dilapidated apartment while Danielle is one of two children raised by 
wealthy parents in suburbia.  Cassie must lie, cheat, and steal to survive while Danielle 
lives comfortably and is taught to share her wealth with others.  Cassie and Danielle grow 
up to have extremely different character dispositions.  While one might want to say that 
Danielle is a better person than Cassie, it is certainly not clear that Danielle is any more 
praiseworthy than Cassie.  In an attempt to determine who is more praiseworthy, one 
would have to see how Cassie would respond to Danielle’s circumstances and vice versa.  
The question, however, is how to drastically change Cassie’s circumstances without 
destroying her identity.  What is it about Cassie that must be kept constant? 
 I am inclined to believe that the only thing that would enable such a drastic 
change without destroying Cassie’s identity would be something immaterial, her soul for 
example.  Although this suggestion is undoubtedly controversial, I take it that almost any 
response to the problem of personal identity is similarly controversial.  Assuming, 
therefore, that it is not impossible for Cassie to have an immaterial soul that informs her 
body yet does not supervene on her body,
51
 it is possible that Cassie’s soul could inform 
some other body, specifically Danielle’s body.  Thus, I contend that it is possible to 
drastically changing one’s circumstances by without destroying one’s identity.  
 My response to the identity problem raises another worry, however, namely that 
insofar as there are an infinite number of bodies that Cassie’s soul could inform, Cassie 
                                                 
51 According to Stump 2005: 191-216, Saint Thomas Aquinas held such a view.  
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performs an infinite number of counterfactual acts.  The problem is that if Cassie 
performs an infinite number of counterfactual acts and she is neither perfectly moral nor 
perfectly immoral, then Cassie is both culpable and laudable for an infinite number of 
counterfactual acts.  Moreover, if that is the case, there is no way to differentiate Cassie’s 
culpability or laudability from anyone else’s, unless of course there is someone who is 
perfectly moral or perfectly immoral.   
 While I believe I must admit that both Cassie and Danielle would be responsible 
for a great number of acts, I see no reason why I must admit that they would be 
responsible for an infinite number of acts.  It could be argued that once one evaluates 
Cassie and Danielle in enough counterfactual scenarios, it will be clear which of the two 
is morally better than the other in the same way that representative sampling makes it 
clear which of two presidential candidates will win the upcoming election.  It could also 
be argued that there are a limited number of counterfactual scenarios in which individuals 
such as Cassie and Danielle could find themselves.  That is, there may be some 
metaphysical fact limiting the number of possible worlds in which they have 
counterparts.  
 Speaking of moral perfection, a final worry might be that my theory makes it 
impossible to be perfectly moral.  That is, if counterfactual facts influence moral 
assessment and one cannot possibly avoid acting wrongly in some counterfactual 
situation, then one cannot possibly be perfectly moral.  Although some might believe this 
consequence speaks against my view, I believe that it speaks in favor of it.  According to 
the control principle, moral responsibility and therefore moral assessment is incompatible 
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with luck.  Given how difficult it is to be perfectly moral in the actual world, however, it 
is unimaginable that one could be perfectly moral without being lucky.  Thus, because 
luck is necessary for being perfectly moral but incompatible with moral assessment, 
being perfectly moral is impossible. 
 To see this, consider an example.  Following Kant, I assume that individuals are 
required to develop their talents and share them with others.  Someone particularly 
artistic, for example, is required to develop his or her artistic abilities and to share those 
abilities with others (e.g., by displaying or selling his or her art). This is difficult, 
however, for it is not only hard to determine the appropriate degree to which one ought to 
develop one’s abilities, but it is also hard to be disciplined enough to succeed in 
developing one’s abilities to the appropriate degree.52  Although I imagine some 
individuals develop some of their talents to the appropriate degree, I doubt that any 
individual develops all of his or her talents to the appropriate degree.  If this is a moral 
requirement, however, then it seems that all individuals fail to be perfectly moral.  Now, I 
do not doubt that it would be possible to develop all of one’s talents to the correct degree 
but only that doing so would require luck.  Thus, because luck, which is necessary for 
developing all of one’s talents to the correct degree and therefore for being perfectly 
moral, is incompatible with moral assessment, being perfectly moral is impossible. 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 One may not be required to develop one’s abilities to an exact degree, but one is at least required to 
develop one’s abilities to a certain range of degrees. 
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Conclusion 
 The purpose of this section was to argue that the control principle need not be 
abandoned in order to preserve the possibility of moral assessment and to explain how to 
think about moral assessment given the existence of resultant, circumstantial, and 
constitutive luck.  The picture of moral assessment that has emerged is a counterfactual 
one, which seems to capture the way comparative moral judgments are ordinarily made.  
In the following section, I argue that this counterfactual account of moral assessment 
provides reason to think that virtue ethical accounts of morality are superior to their 
consequentialist and deontological counterparts.  To do that, I lay out the respective 
moral theories and describe how they might respond to the problems posed by resultant, 
circumstantial, and constitutive luck. 
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V. AN ARGUMENT FOR VIRTUE ETHICS 
 Earlier I asserted that the making of hypological judgments is necessary for the 
making of aretaic and deontic judgments and therefore emphasized the role of 
hypological judgments in moral assessment.  I realize that one might object to that 
assessment, contending that the making of aretaic judgments about virtue or deontic 
judgments about right action is possible without the making of hypological judgments.  
For example, one might claim that honesty is a virtue regardless of whether the individual 
in question is responsible for his or her honesty.  Similarly, one might claim that acts of 
truth-telling are right regardless of whether individuals are responsible for them.  Such 
arguments, I believe, are doomed to fail.  Take a case of truth-telling in which a teenager, 
Erin, is the lone witnesses to a robbery carried out by her father.  The prosecution needs 
Erin’s testimony to convict her father, but Erin resists testifying against him in fear of 
what her life would be like without her father.  Given Erin’s unwillingness to confess, the 
prosecution hooks her up to a machine that forces her to give an honest answer to any 
question she is asked.  When asked whether her father committed the robbery, Erin 
unwillingly answers in the affirmative.  If control is unnecessary for right action, then 
Erin acts rightly.  But Erin does not act rightly, not because she acts wrongly but because 
her act is not the kind of thing that could be right or wrong.   
 While this example shows that right action requires control, I imagine one might 
remain skeptical about whether virtue requires control.  Illustrating that, however, is not 
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much more difficult than illustrating that right action requires control.  One need only 
alter the previous example such that Erin is always hooked up to this device and therefore 
always tells the truth.  Consequently, Erin is reliably disposed to tell the truth, and 
assuming that control is unnecessary for virtue, Erin has the virtue of honesty.  But Erin 
does not have the virtue of honesty, not because she is not reliably disposed to tell lies but 
because her reliable disposition to tell the truth is not the kind disposition that could be 
virtuous.  Thus, both virtue and right action require control, and therefore the making of 
hypological judgments is necessary for the making of aretaic and deontic judgments. 
  
Consequentialism 
 In spite of the previous statement, moral theorists have historically paid relatively 
little attention to hypological judgments, choosing instead to assume the existence of free 
will and focusing their attention on determining the kind of person one should be and the 
kinds of actions one should perform.  Over time, their efforts have produced three 
preeminent moral theories, consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics.   
 The first of these theories I want to address is consequentialism, which comes in a 
variety of forms.  Nevertheless, consequentialist theories are united in their agreement 
that right action is action the effect of which is or is expected to be maximally valuable.
53
  
In other words, all consequentialist theories see action as valuable only insofar as it 
produces the most good.  The most prominent form of consequentialism is utilitarianism 
                                                 
53 Shafer-Landau 2007(a): 453.   
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according to which happiness is the only good.  Thus, utilitarians believe that agents are 
virtuous and acts right iff they maximize happiness. 
 Although the simplicity of consequentialist theories (e.g., utilitarianism) makes 
them attractive, consequentialist theories of moral assessment tend to produce 
counterintuitive conclusions in cases of luck.  Because such theories evaluate agents and 
actions in terms of their effects and because the effects of an agent’s character 
dispositions or actions are often beyond his or her control, consequentialist theories of 
moral assessment base assessment on facts beyond an agent’s control.  Instead of 
endorsing theories of moral assessment on which agents and actions are evaluated in 
terms of their actual effects, some consequentialists endorse theories of moral assessment 
on which agents and actions are evaluated in terms of their expected effects.  While this 
strategy initially seems promising, it fails to do much better than the original view.  One 
reason for this is that one’s expectations are no less subject to luck than one’s effects 
are.
54
  That is, what one expects to happen as a result of one’s actions is going to depend 
on one’s past experiences, and one’s past experiences, as I have argued, are no more 
within one’s control than one’s effects.   
 One might try to salvage consequentialism by adopting a theory of moral 
assessment on which virtue and right action depend not on the effects expected by 
ordinary agents but on the effects expected by an ideal observer (e.g., a maximally 
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and effects.  Consequently, there will likely be similarities between the way luck influences moral virtue 
and the way it influences epistemic virtue. 
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rational or omniscient agent).
55
  On such a view, one is virtuous or acts rightly by 
determining what action an ideal observer would expect to have the best effects and then 
performing that action.  My worry, however, is that this is no longer a consequentialist 
view, for what seems to make an action right is not the fact that it maximizes good but 
the fact that it meets certain criteria.  If I am correct that what makes an action right on 
this view is the fact that it is expected to maximize goods from the perspective of an ideal 
observer, then what makes an action right is the fact that it meets certain criteria.  If, 
however, what makes an action right is the fact that it meets certain criteria, then what 
makes an action right is a fact about the act itself, not about its consequences, a tenet of 
deontological views.  If I am wrong and what makes an action right on this view is the 
fact that it maximizes good, then the view will describe resultantly lucky action as right 
when it should be described as wrong.   
 I imagine that one could argue that what makes an action right is that it both 
meets certain criteria, a fact about the act, and maximizes good, a fact about the act’s 
consequences.  This position, I imagine, could accurately be described as a 
consequentialist view, but it has started to look like a virtue ethical one.  What 
differentiates this view from a virtue ethical one, I contend, is the fact that does not 
appear to concern itself with counterfactuals circumstances.  Thus, virtuous agents on this 
account need only meet certain criteria and maximize goods in the actual world, not 
nearby possible ones.  This will be a problem given the existence of circumstantial luck, 
                                                 
55 Julia Driver contrasts a subjective consequentialist view like this, on which the right-making properties 
of action are internal to the agent, with her own objective consequentialist view on which the right-making 
properties of action are external to the agent (Driver 2001: 70). 
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for this view will describe circumstantially lucky individuals as virtuous when, in fact, 
they should not be. 
 In “Uneasy Virtue,” Julia Driver advances a consequentialist theory on which “a 
virtue is a character trait that produces more good (in the actual world) than not 
systematically.”56  Thus, on Driver’s account, what it means for one to be virtuous is for 
one to have character traits that systematically produce more good that not in the actual 
world.  Conversely, what it means for one to be vicious is for one to have character traits 
that systematically produce more evil than not in the actual world.  According to Driver, 
therefore, anyone who has traits that produce more good than not in the actual world is 
virtuous, and anyone who has traits that produce more evil than not in the actual is 
vicious.   
 One problem with Driver’s account is that agents like Danielle who share with 
others are deemed virtuous even if their disposition to share with others is beyond their 
control.
57
  To illustrate the worry, assume that Danielle is disposed to sharing with others 
only because of certain genetic facts about her or because she was raised in a particularly 
lucky environment.  Moreover, assume that had she been raised in a neutral environment 
over which she had more control she would have developed dispositions to lie, cheat, and 
steal.  Given this information, one is unlikely to consider Danielle virtuous.  In fact, one 
might even consider Danielle vicious.  Thus, Driver’s account, which deems Danielle 
virtuous, assesses Danielle inappropriately. 
                                                 
56 Driver 2001: 82 [emphasis in original]. 
57 I assume that the disposition to share with others is a trait that systematically produces more good than 
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 Another problem with Driver’s account is that agents like Cassie who lie, cheat, 
and steal are deemed vicious even if their lying, cheating, and stealing is beyond their 
control.
58
  To illustrate this worry, assume that Cassie is disposed to lying, cheating, and 
stealing only because of certain genetic facts about her or because she was raised in a 
particularly unlucky environment.  Moreover, assume that had she been raised in a 
neutral environment over which she had more control she would have developed the 
disposition to share with others.  Given this information, one is unlikely to consider 
Cassie vicious.  In fact, one might even consider Cassie virtuous.  Thus, Driver’s account, 
which deems Cassie vicious, assesses Cassie inappropriately.  
 Given what has been said, it should be clear that consequentialist theories of 
moral assessment praise lucky agents and blame unlucky ones, thereby violating the 
control principle.  While one might attempt to save consequentialism by grounding moral 
assessment in expected effects or the expected effects of an ideal observer rather than 
actual effects, such views are more appropriately grouped with deontological views than 
with other consequentialist views.  There is, however, another way one might try to save 
consequentialism, namely by arguing that moral assessment should be based not on all of 
one’s effects but on those effects that are within one’s control.  Such a strategy was 
suggested earlier during the discussion of resultant luck, and although it would avoid 
some of the problems that plague Driver’s theory, it fails to provide much information on 
which to base moral assessment. 
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 Ultimately, the existence of luck rules out or at least threatens to rule out the 
possibility that consequentialism is the best moral theory.  However, the fact that 
consequentialism is not the best moral theory does not indicate that moral assessment 
should ignore the effects of actions.  Because the effects of action are an important if not 
essential element of morality, they ought to be taken into account.  That being said, it is 
not always an action’s actual effects but sometimes its counterfactual effects that should 
serve as the basis for moral assessment.  Thus, the problem with consequentialist theories 
of moral assessment is not that they focus on the effects of actions but rather that they 
focus on the actual effects of actions. 
 
Deontology 
 Although deontology, like consequentialism, comes in a variety of forms, its 
defenders generally agree that right action is not instrumentally but intrinsically 
valuable.
59
  More specifically, deontologists hold that the right action is that which is in 
accordance with a rule or set of rules and that wrong action, conversely, is that which 
violates that rule or set of rules.  The most prominent form of deontology is that proposed 
by Kant, who argues that an action has moral worth only if it is performed from duty and 
therefore that its worth is not derived from its effects but from “the maxim according to 
which the action is determined.”60  According to Kant, those maxims that confer moral 
worth to the actions they determine are those that are universalizable.  Thus, Kant’s 
categorical imperative requires one never to act “except in such a way that [one] can also 
                                                 
59 Shafer-Landau 2007(b): 521. 
60 Kant 1993: 12-13. 
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will that [one’s] maxim should become a universal law.”61  Given this account of right 
action, a virtuous agent is one who acts from the categorical imperative and thereby 
possesses the only thing that is good without qualification, a good will.
62
 
 One attractive feature of deontological theories like Kant’s is the ease with which 
they deal with cases of luck, particularly cases of resultant luck.  Because Kantian moral 
assessment is grounded in what motivates action rather than its effects, effects do not 
play any role in Kantian moral assessment.  Furthermore, because effects do not play a 
role in Kantian moral assessment, resultant luck does not affect the way Kantian 
deontologists assess agents.   
 Consider Zimmerman’s example of resultant luck in which Georg’s attempt on 
Henrik’s life fails when his bullet impacts a passing bird.  Furthermore, imagine that 
Georg’s killing the bird is an exceptionally good outcome because the bird is either 
particularly troublesome or particularly tasty.
63
  Whereas a consequentialist might say 
that such action is right on account of the fact that it maximizes some good, a Kantian 
deontologist will say that such action is wrong on account of the fact that the maxim of 
Georg’s act is not universalizable.  Assuming that Georg’s act is, in fact, wrong, the 
Kantian assesses his act appropriately while the consequentialist does not.  This example 
suggests that deontological theories are better than consequentialist ones at assessing 
cases of resultant luck.   
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62 Kant 1993: 7. 
63 No offense is meant to my vegetarian or vegan readers. 
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 Although deontological theories are better than consequentialist ones at assessing 
cases of resultant luck, they are not necessarily better than consequentialist ones at 
assessing cases of circumstantial luck.  Because one’s actions, like the effects of one’s 
actions, are often beyond one’s control, deontological theories that ground moral 
assessment in action itself do so improperly in cases where one’s actions are beyond 
one’s control.  Nevertheless, Kantians may be able to avoid this criticism in certain cases 
insofar as they ground moral assessment in one’s will rather than one’s actions.  
According to Kant, actions derive their value from the value of the will that produces 
them.  Therefore, actions are valuable only if they are produced by a will that acts from 
duty.  In Zimmerman’s example of circumstantial luck, both Georg and George intend, or 
will, the death of their respective targets.  While George succeeds, Georg fails because of 
the circumstances in which he finds himself.  Even if the example is altered such that 
circumstantial luck not only prevents Georg from attempting to kill Henrik but also 
causes him to perform a particularly appropriate act, Kantians remain capable of 
condemning George on account of the fact that his action is produced by a will that aims 
at killing Henrik, an act the maxim of which is not universalizable. 
 Even if Kantians are able to assess agents appropriately in some cases of 
circumstantial luck (e.g., Zimmerman’s), they are not able to assess agents appropriately 
in all cases of circumstantial luck.  In Nagel’s case of circumstantial luck, for example, 
one is asked to compare the morality of an individual who becomes an officer in Nazi 
Germany with the morality of another individual who, though he does not become an 
officer in Nazi Germany, fails to do so only because he leaves Germany for business 
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reasons in 1930.  In Zimmerman’s example, Kantians can blame Georg because, although 
he does not kill Henrik, his will aims at killing Henrik, an act the maxim of which is not 
universalizable.  In Nagel’s example, however, Kantians cannot employ the same 
strategy, for the individual who leaves Germany for business reasons never aims at any 
action the maxim of which is not universalizable.  Thus, although such an individual is 
culpable for his disposition to become a Nazi officer, Kantians have no way of explaining 
his culpability. 
 Consequently, although Kantians are capable of dealing with cases of resultant 
and some cases of circumstantial luck, they are incapable of dealing with all cases of 
circumstantial luck.  What is more, they are also incapable of dealing with cases of 
constitutive luck, the kind of luck that exists when one’s attitudes or behaviors are 
influenced by factors beyond one’s control.  Because Kant worked under the assumption 
that individuals have free will, he assumed that they are therefore capable of doing 
whatever they please.  Nagel’s arguments for the existence of constitutive luck suggests 
otherwise, however, and thereby undermines Kant’s view.  Assuming that Nagel is 
correct, agents are not necessarily responsible for what they intend, or will, and thus 
Kantians, who base moral assessment on the will, assess agents inappropriately in cases 
of constitutive luck. 
 The existence of circumstantial and constitutive luck therefore rules out, or at 
least threatens to rule out, the possibility that deontology could be the best moral theory.  
An additional problem with deontology, however, is the fact that it does not place enough 
value on the effects of actions.  Some deontological theories (e.g., divine command 
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theory) completely ignore the effects of actions.  Other deontological theories, though 
they do not completely ignore the effects of actions, attend to the wrong ones.  Kant’s 
theory, for example, considers the counterfactual effects of universalized maxims to 
determine whether actions performed from such maxims results in inconsistency.  The 
problem with this is that the counterfactuals effects of universalized maxims are not or 
are at least not obviously as informative as they should be about an action’s rightness.  
While I am willing to admit that actions performed from maxims the universalization of 
which results in inconsistency are wrong, actions need not be performed from maxims the 
universalization of which results in inconsistency in order to be wrong.  For example, 
fulfilling one’s promises is ordinarily right, and it does not seem that any inconsistency 
would result if everyone fulfilled their promises.  Nevertheless, imagine a case in which 
an individual promises to meet a friend for lunch at a particular time but comes across a 
drowning stranger on the way.  Even if the individual must miss lunch in order to save 
the drowning stranger, the individual should nevertheless do so.  On Kant’s theory, 
however, it is at least permissible for the individual to ignore the drowning stranger in 
order to fulfill his promise.   
 In the end, I believe that there is something correct about the consequentialist 
suggestion that virtue, vice, rightness, and wrongness are grounded in the effects of 
action.  Thus, a deontological theory that ignores the effects of action could not be the 
best moral theory.  The problem, however, is that few deontological theories value the 
effects of actions and those that do value the wrong ones.  As a result, deontological 
theories are not only incapable of avoiding problems posed by cases of circumstantial and 
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constitutive luck but also fail to attend to the effects of actions, which should play an 
important role in moral assessment. 
 
Virtue Ethics 
 Virtue ethics is the last of the three preeminent moral theories, and like the others, 
it too comes in a variety of forms.  What unites its proponents, according to Russ Shafer-
Landau, is the belief that actions are right “because they exemplify virtuous character 
traits, and not because they conform to some already-specified moral rule.”64  Thus, 
whereas consequentialists determine right action by evaluating an act’s effects and 
deontologists determine right action by evaluating an act’s relationship to a rule or set of 
rules, virtue ethicists determine right action by evaluating the character traits that produce 
it. 
 As a result, determining whether certain actions are right on a particular virtue 
ethical theory requires determining what character traits are virtuous.  According to 
Aristotle, virtuous character traits are means between vices.  Courage, for instance, is 
described by Aristotle as “a mean with respect to things that inspire confidence or fear” 
that lies between rashness and cowardice.
65
  Temperance is similarly described by 
Aristotle as “a mean with regard to pleasures” that lies between self-indulgence and 
insensibility.
66
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 Although this information is helpful for determining the kind of thing virtuous 
character traits are, it remains unclear how to find the mean between any two vices.  
Where, for example, is the mean between rashness and cowardice or between self-
indulgence and insensibility?  Although Aristotle does not answer that question directly, 
his theory seems to be one on which virtuous character traits are behavioral dispositions 
which not only aim at but also bring about goods.  This reading of Aristotle is endorsed 
by Driver who writes, “A view such as the one advocated by Aristotle is arguably a 
mixed view.  Internal factors, such as aiming at virtue for its own sake, or acting with 
some correct conception of the good or noble, and so on are necessary to virtue but not 
sufficient.  Some external requirement also exists in that for a trait to really be a virtue, it 
must somehow contribute to human flourishing.”67   
 On Aristotle’s view, one who is courageous, for example, avoids rashness by 
recognizing the value of life and avoids cowardice by recognizing that there are things 
other than life that are valuable.  Similarly, one who is temperate avoids insensibility by 
recognizing the value of pleasure and avoids self-indulgence by recognizing that there are 
things other than pleasure that are valuable.  The virtuous individual is therefore one who 
both recognizes goods as such and recognizes how their values relate to one another.  
This is not sufficient for virtue, however, for as Driver’s quote suggests, a trait must not 
only aim at but also bring about a good in order to be virtuous.  Thus, in “A Virtue 
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Ethical Account of Right Action,” Christine Swanton contends that acts are virtuous if 
and only if they are both performed from virtue and hit their targets.
68
 
 If virtuous agents are those who have virtuous character traits and virtuous 
character traits are behavioral dispositions that not only aim at but also bring about 
certain goods, then virtuous agents are those who have behavioral dispositions to aim at 
and bring about certain goods.  Thus, virtue ethics is by its very nature a counterfactual 
theory of moral assessment, for insofar as virtuous agents are those disposed to bring 
about certain goods, determining whether or not one is virtuous requires evaluating both 
one’s actual and counterfactual behavior. 
 According to virtue ethicists, what is necessary for virtue is not that agents 
maximize good in the actual world but that agents maximize good in the counterfactual 
worlds in which they have control over their character dispositions, actions, and effects.  
Thus, where consequentialists are bad at assessing agents in cases of luck because they 
evaluate actual effects, virtue ethicists are good at assessing agents in cases of luck 
because they evaluate counterfactual effects, specifically counterfactual effects that are 
not influenced by factors beyond one’s control.   
 To illustrate this difference, I want to briefly compare Driver’s consequentialist 
view to my virtue ethical view.  According to Driver, agents are virtuous if and only if 
they have character traits that systematically maximize good in the actual world.  
According to me, agents are virtuous if and only if they have character traits that 
systematically maximize good across counterfactual worlds.  Because it is possible for 
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someone who is lucky to have character traits that systematically maximize good in the 
actual world, it possible for someone who is lucky to be virtuous on Driver’s account.  
Because it is impossible for someone who is lucky to have character traits that 
systematically maximize good across counterfactual worlds, it is impossible for someone 
who is lucky to be virtuous on my account.  Thus, Driver is forced to abandon the control 
principle while I am not. 
 I should also note that the virtue ethicist’s use of counterfactuals allows him or 
her to take the effects of one’s actions into consideration when conducting moral 
assessment.  So, whereas deontologists must eliminate the consequentialist requirement 
that the production of good effects is necessary for virtue in order to avoid the problems 
posed by luck, virtue ethicists need not eliminate the consequentialist requirement that 
the production of good effects is necessary for virtue in order to avoid such problems. 
  Although virtue ethics avoids the objections I have leveled against 
consequentialism and deontology, it is not therefore immune to criticism.  For example, 
John Doris, in “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics,” uses empirical evidence to argue 
that stable character dispositions (i.e., virtues) do not exist.
69
  As I see it, Doris’ worry is 
simply that individuals have less control over their character dispositions than virtue 
ethicists ordinarily assume, a worry similar to Nagel’s.  Thus, while I am willing to admit 
that Doris’ argument threatens a central tenet of virtue ethical theories (viz., the 
assumption that individuals have control over their character dispositions), I do not think 
it threatens anything I have said. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 I began by presenting the problem of moral luck as posed by Thomas Nagel and 
arguing that, given the existence of resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive luck, one 
hoping to preserve the possibility of moral assessment must either reject the control 
principle or accept a counterfactual theory of moral assessment.  I then drew from the 
work of Michael J. Zimmerman to construct and defend such a theory, thereby preserving 
the control principle.   
 In closing, I have explained why one who accepts a counterfactual theory of 
moral assessment should prefer virtue ethical accounts of morality to consequentialist or 
deontological accounts.  In particular, I have argued that consequentialism, on which 
virtuous agents are those who maximize good in the actual world, falls prey to problems 
posed by luck.  I have also argued that deontology, on which virtuous agents are those 
who act in accordance with a rule or set of rules, is forced to ignore the effects of action.  
Because the best moral theory should neither fall prey to problems posed by luck nor 
ignore the effects of action, I contend that virtue ethics, on which virtuous agents are 
those disposed to both aim at and bring about certain goods, is the best moral theory. 
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